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Abstract
Could we significantly reduce U.S. unemployment by helping job seekers move closer
to jobs? Using data from the leading employment board CareerBuilder.com, we show
that, indeed, workers dislike applying to distant jobs: job seekers are 35% less likely
to apply to a job 10 miles away from their ZIP code of residence. However, because
job seekers are close enough to vacancies on average, this distaste for distance is fairly
inconsequential: our search and matching model predicts that relocating job seekers
to minimize unemployment would decrease unemployment by only 5.3%. Geographic
mismatch is thus a minor driver of aggregate unemployment.
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1 Introduction
The sharp rise in unemployment during the Great Recession prompted some
researchers to consider the role of increasing geographical mismatch between
jobs and job seekers. Şahin et al. (2014) found this channel to be of limited
importance1. Even if geographic mismatch did not contribute much to in-
creasing unemployment during the Great Recession, this does not imply that
geographic mismatch plays no role in the level of unemployment. Determining
the level of mismatch unemployment is important because it allows us to pre-
dict the effects of policies that aim at bringing job seekers and vacancies closer
to each other (Fan, 2012; Neumark and Kolko, 2010; Kline and Moretti, 2013;
Busso et al., 2013; Neumark and Simpson, 2014). In this paper, we exploit a
large and rich dataset to determine the level of geographic mismatch in the
U.S. and find that such mismatch is limited.
We use ZIP code level data from CareerBuilder.com on the geography
of job search for close to 500,000 job seekers sending more than 5 million
applications in 2012. CareerBuilder.com is arguably the largest job board in
the U.S., and is broadly representative of the U.S. labor market.2 We find that
job seekers are more likely to apply to jobs closer to home: a job seeker is 35%
less likely to apply to a vacancy that is 10 miles away than to a vacancy that
is in the job seekers’ ZIP code of residence. Still, job seekers send 11% of their
applications to out-of-state vacancies.
1Relatedly, evidence does not support the “house lock” hypothesis during the Great Re-
cession. Indeed, homeowners’ lower mobility did not contribute to increasing unemployment
(Farber, 2012; Valletta, 2013).
2Monster.com is the other leading job board and is comparable in size. Which of Ca-
reerBuilder or Monster is larger depends on the exact size metric used.
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To determine the level of geographic mismatch, we use a directed search
model where workers strategically choose where to send their applications given
that vacancies closer to home yield higher utility. The model predicts where
a job seeker applies based on our empirical estimate of distaste for distant
jobs, and the expected probability of getting an offer given the locations of
employers and all other job seekers. We compute the maximum number of
hires that can be obtained by reallocating job seekers across ZIP codes and
leaving the vacancies where they are, which is equivalent to computing the
number of hires if job seekers were equally willing to apply anywhere. Finally,
geographic mismatch is measured as the difference between the number of
hires with the hires-maximizing geographic distribution of job seekers and the
number of hires with the existing geographic distribution of job seekers. 5.3%
of hires are lost due to job seekers not being close enough to jobs, suggesting
that policies aimed at reducing the distance between jobs and job seekers are
likely to have a limited impact on aggregate unemployment3.
Our paper makes two key contributions to the literature. On the theo-
retical side, we develop a new model of geographic mismatch that fully takes
into account the geography of job search, in contrast to prior measures of ge-
ographic mismatch that assume job seekers only search in their own location
(e.g. Lazear and Spletzer, 2012; Şahin et al., 2014; Herz and Van Rens, 2015).
While Manning and Petrongolo (2011) used a model that takes into account
the geography of job search, they did not address mismatch. Our model fully
3To the extent that such policies create jobs on net, this would change our conclusion,
which only pertains to moving jobs or job seekers while keeping their numbers fixed. Fur-
thermore, such policies can have important distributional impacts, which we do not address
here.
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takes into account the geography of job search and thus allows us to pin down
the level of geographic mismatch. Finally, we develop a simple mismatch index
that is much easier to compute (appendix D), and yields very similar results
to our main estimates.
Our second key contribution is empirical. We use detailed ZIP code level
data on applications in the U.S., while Manning and Petrongolo (2011) indi-
rectly infer distaste for distance in the UK from their model and the location
of job seekers and jobs. Our data allows us to take into account applications
across geographic units such as MSAs, and has sufficiently high geographic res-
olution (ZIP code level) that we can take into account within MSA frictions
as well. Allowing application across geographic units is important, because it
typically significantly reduces empirical estimates of mismatch. Furthermore,
our model and data allow us to combine mismatch by geography and occu-
pation to show that mismatch remains relatively low even when we take into
account heterogeneity by 2-digit occupations. Arguably, prior literature on
geographic mismatch did not attempt to develop models that fully take into
account the geography of job search or applications across occupations because
of a lack of adequate data to estimate such models. We are thus in the priv-
ileged position to have the necessary data to estimate a model of geographic
(and occupational) mismatch that is significantly more realistic.
Our paper is related to the literature on mismatch (e.g. Lazear and Splet-
zer, 2012; Şahin et al., 2014; Herz and Van Rens, 2015) and the efficiency of
the matching function (e.g. Barlevy, 2011; Veracierto, 2011; Davis et al., 2012;
Barnichon and Figura, 2013) during and after the Great Recession. Com-
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pared to this literature, we focus on precisely measuring one specific type of
mismatch: geographic mismatch.
Our paper is related to the literature on geographic mobility in the U.S.
(Molloy et al., 2011; Greenwood et al., 1986; Bound and Holzer, 2000; Wozniak,
2010). Our results complement this literature by investigating the macro effect
of such mobility. Our work is also related to the urban economics literature
that investigates the distance between the place of residence and the place of
employment, and the spatial mismatch hypothesis (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist,
1998; Hellerstein et al., 2008; Rupert and Wasmer, 2012; McKenzie, 2013;
Guglielminetti et al., 2015). We complement this research with evidence on
the job search process.
Finally, the evidence we provide about the geography of job search is
relevant to the literature on the impact evaluation of many types of local
labor market shocks 4.
The next section presents the data. In the third section, we present our
theoretical framework. In the fourth section, we provide results about the
geography of job search and the level of geographic mismatch. Section five
provides robustness tests and extensions. Section six concludes.
4This issue is relevant to measure the impact of immigrants on natives’ wages or employ-
ment rates (Card, 1990; Altonji and Card, 1991; Friedberg and Hunt, 1995; Borjas et al.,
1996, 1997; DiNardo and Card, 2000; Card, 2001, 2005; Borjas, 2003; Ottaviano and Peri,
2006), the impact of local shocks on labor demand and supply (Blanchard and Katz, 1992;
Bound and Holzer, 2000; Notowidigdo, 2011; Yagan, 2016), the impact of trade and FDI on
labor market outcomes (Autor et al., 2013a,b), the equilibrium effects of active labor market
policies (Davidson and Woodbury, 1993; Blundell et al., 2004; Gautier et al., 2012; Crépon
et al., 2013; Ferracci et al., 2014), the heterogeneity of the negative duration dependence
with local conditions (Kroft et al., 2013), or spatial mismatch (Patacchini and Zenou, 2005;
Hellerstein et al., 2008; Boustan and Margo, 2009; Åslund et al., 2010).
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2 The Geography of Job Search
2.1 Data
We use proprietary data provided by CareerBuilder.com, the largest U.S. em-
ployment website. We merge three data sets extracted from CareerBuilder’s
database. The first one is a random sample of registered users whose accounts
were active between April and June 2012. For each job seeker, we have the
residence location at the ZIP code level. In order for our results to be compa-
rable with prior literature on job search, we restrict the data to unemployed
users. After dropping those who do not reside in the U.S., who live in Alaska
and Puerto Rico, and those whose location is unknown, we end up with a data
set of 451,783 users.
The second data set is a sample of vacancies published on the website
between April and June 2012, and therefore available to the job seekers to
apply to. For each job, we know its location at the ZIP code level. Remov-
ing non-consistent observations, duplicates and vacancies not located in the
U.S. (or located in Alaska or Puerto Rico), and vacancies without ZIP code
information leaves 696,975 observations. 37% of the vacancy sample is lost
due to the ZIP code availability restriction. We check whether these vacancies
without ZIP code are different in terms of location or occupation compared to
the vacancies with a ZIP code. The correlation between the city counts of va-
cancies with ZIP code and without ZIP code is 0.97. The correlation between
the SOC-6 level count of vacancies with and without a ZIP code is 0.91. We
conclude that vacancies without a ZIP code have the same distribution across
6
cities and occupations as vacancies with a ZIP code, and thus omitting these
vacancies should not bias our results5. Finally, the third data set connects
the two previous data sets by showing which jobs each job seeker applied to.
An application is defined as a click on the “Apply now” button that can be
found on the full job listing webpage. On average, job seekers sent around
12.8 applications, and vacancies receive 15.8 applications from job seekers in
this sample.
We now address the representativity of the data. Background work
(Marinescu and Wolthoff, 2015) was done to compare the industry distribution
of job vacancies in CareerBuilder.com with the distribution in Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS). Compared to the distribution of vacan-
cies across industries in JOLTS, some industries are overrepresented in Career-
Builder data, in particular information technology, finance and insurance, and
real estate, rental and leasing. The most underrepresented industries are state
and local government, accommodation and food services, other services, and
construction6. While the vacancies on CareerBuilder are not perfectly repre-
sentative of the ones in the U.S. economy as a whole, they form a substantial
fraction of the market. Indeed, the number of vacancies on CareerBuilder.com
represented 35% of the total number of vacancies in the U.S. in January 2011
as counted in JOLTS.
5In a robustness test (footnote 28), we include these vacancies in our calculation of
mismatch at the MSA and commuting-zone levels, and find that doing doing so yields
almost the same level of mismatch as using the full sample.
6This may raise the concern that CareerBuilder data under-represents some occupations
and industries where mismatch may be the highest. In section 5.1.3 below, we compute
mismatch for low skilled occupations and low educated workers and show that this mismatch
is only slightly higher than the overall mismatch.
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In terms of occupation (2-digit SOC codes), the distribution of unem-
ployed job seekers’ occupations in CareerBuilder data is very similar to the
CPS (correlation of 0.71 between the shares of job seekers in each occupation
in the two datasets), and the distribution of vacancies’ occupations in the Ca-
reerBuilder data is essentially identical to the distribution of vacancies in all
online jobs (correlation of 0.95 with Help Wanted Online data).
Since the geographic aspect is very important for the purpose of this
paper, we verified that the location of vacancies and job seekers in this data
is representative of the location of vacancies and job seekers in the U.S. in
general. Across U.S. regions, vacancies in our dataset are distributed very
similarly to vacancies in the nationally representative Job Openings and Labor
Turnover Survey (JOLTS) in April-June 2012 (96% correlation between the
shares of vacancies in each region in the two datasets). Across U.S. states, job
seekers in this data are also distributed very similarly to the unemployed in
the Current Population Survey in April-June 2012, with a correlation of 88%.
In our data, job seekers send 11% of their applications out of state. Of
these, some will commute to the other state, and some will move. Using the
American Community Survey (ACS) from 2006 to 2010, we find that 4% of em-
ployed people commute across state lines for work. Using the 2008 SIPP panel
covering years 2008-2013, we find that 5.1% of unemployed people who become
employed move across states in the six months before and after the event (this
number accounts for slight differences in the composition of the SIPP sample
in age and education compared to the CareeBuilder sample). These figures
added up together are not far from the 11% of cross-state applications, which
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suggests that the vast majority of applications can be considered as “serious”.
We also compare the destinations of Americans who move across states
in the ACS in 2012 with the destinations of out of state applications in our
data. We find a very high correlation between the destinations of moves and
applications (matrices with the share of moves from each state to each other
state), at 0.82. We perform a similar exercise at the county level, comparing
the destinations of within-state cross-county applications with within-state
cross-county commuting destinations observed in the ACS: we find a high
correlation of 0.78.
In conclusion, our data is broadly representative of the U.S. distribu-
tion of vacancies and job seekers, and the distribution of applications across
geographic units is consistent with the moving and commuting behavior of
Americans.
2.2 Estimating the distaste for distance
To understand the geography of job search, we must understand how important
distance is in job seekers’ application behavior. We first use a descriptive
approach and show, for each commonly used geographic unit, the share of
applications that are sent to jobs within this unit on average across job seekers
(Figure 1).7 The average share of within state applications is 89%. At the
other extreme, the average share of applications within ZIP code is only 4%.
Overall, this descriptive approach suggests that job seekers are willing to apply
away from their ZIP code but that this willingness declines with distance.
7All figures have been made with ggplot2 in R (Wickham, 2009).
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To get a more systematic picture of the impact of geographic distance
on job seekers’ application behavior, we use a Poisson regression to estimate
the probability pij that a job seeker in ZIP code i applies to a vacancy in ZIP
code j as a function of distance between i and j. pij pins down job seekers’
distaste for distance, which will be used to calculate the degree of geographic
mismatch. The distaste for distance is a shorthand for any preference or cost
that makes job seekers less likely to apply to more distance jobs. For example,
the distaste for distance may reflect a search cost: it may be harder to gather
information about employers who are far away because it is harder to visit
workplaces in person.
We model the number of applications from job seekers in ZIP i to va-
cancies in ZIP j as a Poisson8 with parameter µij:
µij = UiVj exp[αi + λj + s(dij)] (1)
where Ui and Vj are the number of job seekers in i and vacancies in j, αi and
λj are fixed effects9 for job seekers’ and vacancies’ ZIP codes respectively, and
s(.) is a spline function whose parameters are estimated. We use a piecewise-
linear spline function, defined by its slopes. With n nodes {d¯i}i=1...n, the spline
is parametrized by n + 1 parameters {γi}i=1...(n+1). It is defined so that the
derivative of the spline with respect to distance is s′(d) = γ1 when distance is
8The data on applications is collapsed by job seeker ZIP code and vacancy ZIP code to
obtain the total count of applications from i to j.
9We estimate conditional fixed-effect models, to deal with the incidental parameter prob-
lem (Hausman et al., 1984). For the model with two-way fixed effects, we follow the estima-
tion procedure proposed by Guimarães and Portugal (2010) and are only able to perform
the estimation on a 10% random subsample, given the computational burden.
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below the first node, i.e. when d < d¯1; then s′(d) =
∑j
i=1 γi when d ∈ (d¯j−1, d¯j)
and j = 2 . . . n; s′(d) =
∑n+1
i=1 γi when d > d¯n. In words, for d < d¯1, a 1 mile
increase in distance multiplies the probability of application by exp(γ1). This
implies that the probability of application changes by approximately γ1% for
a one mile increase in distance.
We chose 10 nodes {d¯i}i=1...10 for the spline that parametrizes workers’
willingness to apply as a function of distance: at 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 100, 200,
500, 1000 and 2000 miles.10
The estimated spline function that captures how far away job seekers
apply is displayed graphically in Figure 2, based on the regression coefficients
{γi}i=1...11 in Table 1. Overall, applications clearly decrease with distance. One
potential concern is that job seekers in different locations may send different
numbers of applications. Similarly, vacancies in some locations may be more
attractive to all job seekers, which could bias our estimates of the distaste
for distance. Reassuringly, the estimate of the spline is not sensitive to the
presence of job seeker ZIP code and vacancy ZIP code fixed effects (Figure 2).
Substantively, job seekers are 38% less likely to apply to a vacancy 10
miles away than to one in their ZIP code of residence (estimates without fixed
effects in the first column of Table 1). At larger distances, the distaste for
distance is much smaller: job seekers are 9% less likely to apply to a vacancy
110 miles away from their ZIP code of residence than to a vacancy 100 miles
10Allowing for a flexible function of distance at smaller distances is important to accurately
identify job seekers’ distaste for distance. Indeed, we have also experimented with a linear
specification in distance and found that it does a worse job than the spline in explaining
the data (Pseudo R2 = 0.53 vs. 0.72 for the spline specification). The linear specification
strongly overestimates job seekers’ willingness to apply at short distances away from their
ZIP code (under 75 miles) compared to the spline specification.
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away. If we take estimates with one-way fixed effects for the job seekers ZIP
codes (the estimates we use to calculate mismatch below), we find very similar
effects, with a 35% and a 9% decline in applications at 10 and 110 miles
respectively.
Is there any systematic difference in the distaste for distance by education
or job type? More educated workers are less likely to apply far away from
home for short distances (below 30 miles) but more likely to apply far away
for long distances (Figure 3). The result for long distances is consistent with
the higher mobility of college educated workers across states (Wozniak, 2010).
In Figure 4, we compare the distaste for distance for the most common 8-
digit SOC among job seekers (customer service representatives) and the most
common 8-digit SOC among vacancies (registered nurse). Customer service
representatives, a relatively low skill occupation, exhibit a higher distaste for
distance than the overall sample. On the other hand, registered nurses have a
higher willingness to apply far away from their ZIP code of residence than the
overall sample.
Overall, we find that job seekers are less likely to apply to vacancies
further away from their ZIP code of residence, and these results are robust to
controls for job seeker and vacancy ZIP code fixed effects. What is yet to be
determined is whether job seekers’ preference for jobs close to home is high
enough to generate substantial geographic mismatch. This is the topic of the
next sections.
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3 Mismatch unemployment with distinct labor
markets
Geographic mismatch occurs when there are too many job seekers (relative
to jobs) in some places and too few in other places. Therefore, a greater ge-
ographic dispersion in labor market tightness (vacancies/unemployment) im-
plies that there is more geographic mismatch. But how can we quantify the
impact of a given level of dispersion in tightness on aggregate unemployment?
To pin down this impact, we need to make assumptions about how the geo-
graphic distribution of job seekers and vacancies affects hires.
Assume that the location of vacancies is exogenous and fixed. Define
mismatch as the percent shortfall in hires resulting from the misallocation of
job seekers, i.e. 1-(Total number of hires given observed geographic allocation
of job seekers)/(Maximum number of hires across all allocations of job seekers).
To calculate the number of hires, we need a matching function, i.e. a mapping
from the geographic distributions of U and V to the total number of hires
(matches).
The standard approach (Nickell, 1982; Jackman and Roper, 1987) as-
sumes that job seekers are equally likely to match with any job within their
home labor market, and will never match with a job outside their home labor
market. A Cobb-Douglas matching function is assumed for each market. In
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this case the mismatch index11 is:
MCD = 1−
∑
i
(
Vi∑
i Vi
)γ (
Ui∑
i Ui
)1−γ
(2)
where Vi, Ui are the number of vacancies and unemployed workers in geographic
area (labor market) i respectively.
Şahin et al. (2014) show that the Cobb-Douglas mismatch index MCD
represents the percentage shortfall in hires obtained with the actual allocation
of job seekers relative to the hires-maximizing allocation of job seekers.In what
follows, we take γ = .5, as in Şahin et al. (2014).
In order to calculate this mismatch index, one must choose a geographic
unit for the location of job seekers, such as the MSA. Working with too broad
areas is likely to create a downward bias on the index. If there is only one area
(e.g. United States), all applications from job seekers residing in this area are
obviously sent within the same area. In this case, the index will obviously be
equal to zero but will understate the actual geographic mismatch. Conversely,
if we use ZIP codes as the unit of observation, we have the opposite problem.
Many applications are directed to vacancies that are not located in the area
where the job seeker resides, and we run the risk of overestimating geographic
mismatch. As demonstrated by Şahin et al. (2014), choosing a larger area to
define the location of job seekers mechanically yields lower mismatch according
to the Cobb-Douglas indexMCD.
The standard approach assumes that job seekers are as likely to apply to
11See Jackman et al. (1989); Lazear and Spletzer (2012) for a dissimilarity index, which
provides a measure of the proportion of the unemployed who are in the “wrong” market.
Using the dissimilarity measure yields qualitative results very similar to Figure 5.
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any job within a geographic unit, regardless of how far jobs may be from job
seekers’ homes. When choosing small units such as ZIP codes, this assumption
seems reasonable. But for larger units such as MSAs, this may no longer be
the case and job seekers may greatly prefer those jobs within the MSA that
are closer to home. Therefore, choosing larger search areas will tend to make
us underestimate the amount of friction within each geographic unit, and this
is a further reason whyMCD is sensitive to the choice of a geographic unit.
Figure 5 shows how mismatchMCD varies with the size of the geographic
area where job seekers are assumed to look for jobs. When job seekers’ search
area is defined as the state, 1.6% of hires are lost due to the misallocation
of job seekers. If we define the search area as the MSA or the commuting
zone (CZ), mismatch is about 2.5%. When search areas are counties, this
figure doubles, to 4.9%; this number is of a similar order of magnitude to the
roughly 3% mismatch found by Şahin et al. (2014) using county level data in
201112. At the ZIP code level, the fraction of hires lost due to misallocation
of job seekers is a very large 22.9%. When using the Cobb-Douglas mismatch
indexMCD, the magnitude of geographic mismatch thus strongly depends on
the size of the geographic area where job seekers are assumed to look for jobs,
with smaller areas yielding larger mismatch values.
12Estimates are not directly comparable due to different data sources and a different time
period.
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4 Mismatch unemployment with interconnected
labor markets
4.1 A search and matching model with interconnected
markets
Our approach to mismatch seeks to overcome the limitations of the standard
approach, which assumes that job seekers only apply to jobs in their own labor
market and are equally likely to apply to any job within their labor market. We
modify the standard mismatch index in two ways. First, we allow job seekers
to apply to jobs in all locations (ZIP codes). Second, in order to be able to
model applications across locations, we replace the Cobb-Douglas matching
function with a standard urn-ball matching function.
Before developing the details of the model, it is worth noting that the
model applies to any setting with heterogeneous labor markets cells. For ex-
ample, while our baseline empirical application focuses on heterogeneity by
geography, we also apply the model to a case where jobs and job seekers differ
by geography and occupation.
Our objective is to obtain an expression for the total number of matches
as a function of the number of job seekers and vacancies in each location,
and structural parameters. We use a directed search model where workers
choose where to send their applications based on the location of the vacancies.
Vacancies closer to job seekers’ home yield higher utility. Our theoretical
model is similar to the one by Manning and Petrongolo (2011), where agents
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must choose a set of places to apply to, and borrows elements from Albrecht
et al. (2006), and Galenianos and Kircher (2009).
Each firm has one vacancy. The location of vacancies is exogenous and
fixed. While this assumption may seem restrictive, geographic mismatch is
going to be even smaller if both vacancies and workers are allowed to relocate
in order to improve their chances of matching. All workers and all firms are
identical, risk neutral, and they produce one unit of output when matched
and zero otherwise. The utility of an employed worker is defined below, and
an unmatched worker has a utility of zero. Workers observe all vacancies.
Workers and vacancies are spread across S locations. i(u) and j(v) denote the
geographic units where unemployed worker u and vacancy v are respectively
located. Each location k has Vk vacancies and Uk unemployed workers. A
worker’s strategy is a set of a¯ vacancies that s/he applies to. The timing of
the game is the following.
1. Job seekers apply to vacancies: each job seeker sends a¯ applications.
2. Firms gather the applications they receive: each application has a prob-
ability q to be valid in the sense that the applicant will produce positive
output if hired. q is a scale parameter: it helps us calibrate the model
by capturing the fact that the matching rate in the labor market is lower
than what can be predicted on the basis of the number of applications
that firms receive. For the sake of tractability, q is assumed to be con-
stant and is not allowed to depend on distance or occupations.13
13In an extension (appendix D.3), we allow q to depend on the previous occupation of
the job seeker in a simplified version of the model. We find that doing so slightly lowers
mismatch.
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3. Firms can only make one offer. If a vacancy has more than one valid
application, the firm randomly picks the job seeker to whom it makes an
offer.
4. Offers are sent to job seekers.
5. Job seekers can only accept one job offer. If a job seeker has received
more than one offer, he accepts the offer that generates the highest utility.
6. Matches are realized. If a firm’s chosen applicant rejects the job offer,
the firm remains unmatched.
The application of a worker u to a vacancy v provides the worker utility
wuv = f(di(u)j(v))εuv, the product of a deterministic decreasing function f of
the geographic distance di(u)j(v) between the job seeker and the vacancy, and
an idiosyncratic term εuv that is job-worker pair specific.
ε is assumed to be uncorrelated across job seekers and vacancies. This
idiosyncratic term ε explains why job seekers do not only apply within their
own ZIP code: some very desirable vacancies (high ε) are located in other ZIP
codes and job seekers have to trade off distance with ε. Second, ε allows for
workers in a given location i to have different preferences over vacancy locations
j. Finally, ε allows for unobserved job heterogeneity within a location from
the point of view of each specific job seeker.
We assume that the probability piuv that a worker u gets an offer for
vacancy v conditional on applying only depends on the location of the vacancy:
piuv = pij(v). This assumption, which is crucial for the tractability of the
model, is also present in Manning and Petrongolo (2011). In an extension
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using a simplified mismatch index (appendix D.2), we allow the probability of
getting an offer to depend on the distance between the applicant and the job.
As is intuitive, if the distance between the applicant and the job lowers the
offer probability, mismatch increases; yet the increase is modest for realistic
assumptions.
We now discuss job seekers’ optimal strategy. If vacancies closer from a
worker’s residence do not have a systematically lower probability of yielding an
offer, a worker’s optimal strategy is to apply to the a¯ vacancies with the highest
expected utility.14 This assumption seems like a reasonable approximation:
distance to workers’ residence and the probability of getting an offer from a
vacancy cannot be systematically negatively correlated because workers are
geographically dispersed.15
Given job seekers’ optimal strategy, we derive pij the probability for a job
seeker in i to apply to a vacancy in j. A job seeker u applies to the a¯ vacancies
with the highest expected utilities pij(v)f(di(u),j(v))εuv. Assuming that ε has a
Pareto distribution16 of parameter α, pij is proportional to piαj fα(dij). Given
that the total number of applications per job seeker is equal to a¯, and denoting
g(dij) = f
α(dij), we obtain:
pij = a¯
piαj g(dij)∑
` pi
α
` g(di`)V`
,∀i, j (3)
The probability of applying pij increases in the probability of getting an offer
14Assuming that a worker can receive at most one offer, as in Manning and Petrongolo
(2011), leads to the same optimal strategy.
15For a more in depth discussion of these assumptions, see Appendix A.
16This assumption is also present in Manning and Petrongolo (2011).
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from a vacancy in j, pij, and decreases with distance dij between the job seeker
and the vacancy, according to the distaste for distance function g.
The probability that job seekers match depends on the probability of
getting an offer from vacancies in each j where they applied, pij. To derive
pij, we first need to determine how many valid applications a vacancy receives.
The total number of applications received by a vacancy located in j from job
seekers located in i is distributed as a Poisson(pijUi). Summing applications
coming from all origins and keeping only the valid ones (probability q), the
distribution of the number of valid applications received by a vacancy in j is
a Poisson(qrj), where rj =
∑
k pkjUk is the expected number of applications
received by a vacancy in j.
From the point of view of job seekers, the probability pij that an appli-
cation generates an offer is the probability that their application is valid (q),
and that it is picked out by the firm among all other valid applications that
the vacancy has received.17
pij = qR (qrj) (4)
where R(x) = [1 − exp(−x)]/x. Combining equations (3) and (4) and elimi-
nating p and q, we obtain:
pij = qR
(
piαj qa¯
∑
k
g(dkj)Uk∑
` pi
α
` g(dk`)V`
)
(5)
The total number of matches can be expressed as the number of job
seekers multiplied by the probability that each job seeker forms a match. The
17pij is equal to q multiplied by the expectation of 1/(Xj + 1), where Xj is the expected
number of valid applications made by other job seekers to the job, with Xj ∼ Poisson (qrj).
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probability that a job seeker matches depends on the number of offers received
by a job seeker in i from vacancies in each location j, which is distributed as
Poisson (pijpijVj). The total number of offers received by this job seeker in
i from all locations is thus distributed as Yi ∼ Poisson (
∑
` pi`pi`V`). A job
seeker in k will match if and only if he receives at least one offer, which is one
minus the probability of getting zero offers, i.e. 1− exp (−∑` pk`pi`V`). Using
equation (3) to substitute pk` by its expression, the total number of matches
M is:
M =
∑
k
Uk
[
1− exp
(
−a¯
∑
` pi
1+α
` g(dk`)V`∑
` pi
α
` g(dk`)V`
)]
(6)
In a nutshell, the total number of matches M is equal to the sum of job
seekers weighted by the probability that each job seeker gets at least one offer.
In turn, the probability of getting at least one offer (in brackets) depends on
the number of vacancies weighted by the probability that a vacancy yields an
offer (pi`) and a decreasing function of the distance from the job seeker (g(dk`)).
How can we determine the total number of hiresM given the parameters
a¯, α, q, g(.), as well as vectors U and V ? Once pi is known, it is straightforward
to find the total number of hires using equation (6). However, pi is difficult to
pin down because pi is a non-linear function of itself: equation (5) defines a
system of S equations where the S pij are the unknowns, and a¯, α, q, g(.), U and
V are the parameters. We do not have a proof for the existence or uniqueness
of a solution vector pi. However, we find numerically that the expression for
pij in equation (5) defines a contraction mapping that reaches an equilibrium
very fast, for a large range of parameters. Trying several starting points always
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leads to the same solution, which argues in favor of a unique equilibrium.18
4.2 Estimation of the structural parameters
We now turn to the issue of estimating the structural parameters of the model:
g, the distaste for distance, α, the Pareto parameter for the match-specific
utility component ε, and q, the probability of a valid application. We start
with describing the parameters we set, and then turn to the estimation of the
structural parameters.
First, we set a¯ as the average number of applications by job seekers
observed in the data.19 Second, because the number of matches in the model
depends on labor market tightness, we must make sure that labor market
tightness in our data is representative of the U.S. economy. To do so, we
apply a proportionality factor to our vacancies so that the aggregate labor
market tightness in our data is the same as in the U.S. economy20.
Turning to the estimation of the structural parameters, we need to deter-
18We can analytically derive pi and a closed for form the mismatch index if we assume
that α = 0, i.e. job seekers do not take into account other job seekers’ applications when
deciding where to apply for jobs (Appendix D). This closed form mismatch index yields
results that are very similar to our preferred mismatch index and can straightforwardly be
used to compute mismatch with other datasets. Another way to get a closed form solution
is provided by Manning and Petrongolo (2011), who can prove the existence and uniqueness
of the solution in a similar case by assuming that q is small enough that job offers made by
employers are always accepted.
19As the total number of hires depends on the product qa¯ and q is estimated, the mismatch
index is actually not sensitive to the value chosen for a¯.
20For each month of April to June 2012, we compute the monthly tightness by dividing
the total number of vacancies (from JOLTS) by the total number of unemployed job seekers
(as reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics based on the Current Population Survey) and
take the average as our measure of national labor market tightness. Keeping the geographic
distribution fixed, we then inflate the number of vacancies in our data such that the global
tightness is equal to the national labor market tightness.
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mine the values of g, α and q given a¯ and vectors U and V . In order to estimate
the distaste for distance g, we choose the parametrization g = exp(ηs(d)),
where s(.) is the spline already estimated in the reduced-form equation (1)
with only job seeker fixed effects, and η is a scalar to be estimated now. As
further discussed below, η allows us to adjust for the potential bias arising
from our estimating s(.) with job seeker fixed effects only rather than both
job seeker and vacancies fixed effects. Under this parametrization of g, the
estimation of g and α amounts to the estimation of two parameters, η and α.
We now explain how the estimation proceeds in order to determine η, α
and q, given U , V and a¯. For each value of (α, η), q is set so that the average
job finding rate predicted by the model matches the national job finding rate
computed using the CPS.21 We estimate α and η by maximum likelihood. For
a given value of (α, η), we can use our model to compute pij, the probability
that an individual in i applies to a job in j. pij is directly related to an observed
quantity, the number of applications from i to j, Aij. According to our model,
Aij is drawn from a Poisson distribution of parameter λij = UiVjpij. We need
to find the values of α and η such that λij(α, η) is the most likely parameter
of the Poisson underlying Aij. Formally, we find α and η by maximizing the
quasi-log-likelihood L(α, η) = ∑i,j Aij log λij(α, η)− λij(α, η).22
We now give an intuition for the identification of η and α. We start with
21The national job finding rate is computed with the CPS as the number of unemployment
to employment transitions in a given month divided by the number of unemployed workers
in the previous month. We then compute a target number of hires Mˆ , equal to the national
job finding rate times the number of job seekers in our sample. q is estimated as the quantity
minimizing the squared difference between the number of hires predicted by the model M
and the target Mˆ .
22As can be seen in appendix Figure 9, the log likelihood has a local maximum in the
neighborhood of the optimal values of η and α.
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the parameter of the distaste for distance η. Consider two distinct ZIP codes
1 and 2. Intuitively, the further away 1 and 2 are from each other, the fewer
across ZIP applications there will be relative to within ZIP applications; so
this comparison of across vs. within ZIP applications allows us to track down
the distaste for distance. Based on our model, the number of applications is
λij = UiVjpij, so this comparison can be written as:
λ12λ21
λ11λ22
=
p12p21
p11p22
=
g(d12)g(d21)
g(d11)g(d22)
= exp(2ηs(d12))
Note that the right-hand side does not depend on the parameter α and thus we
conjecture that η can be identified separately from α. The transformation on λ
is equivalent to introducing fixed effects for origin and destination ZIP codes in
a reduced-form context. If s(.) was estimated using a two-way fixed-effect on
the full sample, we would expect to have η = 1. Using the s(.) estimated with
fixed effects on the job seeker ZIP code23, the maximum likelihood estimate
of η is 1.0020, so the reduced-form estimate of the distaste for distance is
essentially unbiased. Thus, we consider in what follows that g(d) = exp(s(d)).
Now, given η, what is the source of identification for α? We can show
that the expected number of applications received by a vacancy in j is:
rj = qa¯Rα(qrj)
∑
k
Ukg(dkj)
23The one-way job seeker ZIP code fixed effect gives essentially the same estimate for the
distaste for distance as the two-way fixed effects. However, the two-way fixed effect estimate
is only based on 10% of the sample, which is why we use the one-way fixed effect. Either
way, the estimates are so close that mismatch is not sensitive to using the one or the other.
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In this expression, qa¯
∑
k Ukg(dkj) is the number of valid applications that a
given vacancy in j would receive if applicants did not factor in the probability
of getting an offer pij. The term Rα(qrj) plays the role of a moderating force:
if a place attracts more applications rj, Rα(qrj) decreases and moderates the
increase in rj. The higher α, the more this force is at play. A higher α lowers
the dispersion in rj, so α can be identified by matching the rj predicted by
the model to the number of applications observed in the data. In our main
approach, we estimate α, but we show in Appendix D that assuming α = 0
makes the model far more tractable and barely affects the estimated level of
mismatch. This simpler mismatch index can also be used for a number of ex-
tensions to our baseline model, which would otherwise not be computationally
feasible. Furthermore, Appendix D shows that mismatch stays of the same
order of magnitude for a plausible range of values of α.
Table 2 lists the parameters of the model and the values of the estimated
parameters. Note that the probability of a valid application q is quite low
because the job finding rate in the CPS is only 18.2%, despite the fact that
job seekers are sending multiple applications. In order to match the CPS job
finding rate, we must assume that most applicants are not qualified for the
job.
4.3 Mismatch index
In this section, we assume that a social planner can move job seekers at no cost
to maximize the number of hires. Just as in the standard approach (section 3
above), we define mismatch as the difference between the maximum number
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of hires obtained by the planner (M∗) and the number of hires obtained with
the actual allocation of job seekers (M): mismatch is then 1 −M/M∗. Note
that this concept of mismatch has no implications for social welfare defined
in a general way. Mismatch only represents a deviation from the objective of
maximizing the number of matches and thus minimizing aggregate unemploy-
ment.
We want to find the allocation of job seekers that maximizes M . If
distance to jobs did not matter to job seekers, we would have a single integrated
labor market. The social planner would not have to move job seekers: matches
M would be maximized, regardless of the location of job seekers. We thus use
the case of no distaste for distance to infer how the social planner can maximize
hires.
In appendix B, we show that, if job seekers have no distaste for distance,
the probability of getting an offer pi is equalized across locations. This makes
sense because, with no distaste for distance, any job is as good as any other
(up to ε, which is i.i.d.). Based on this observation, we conjecture that, to
maximize hires, the social planner should reallocate job seekers in order to
equalize pi across locations.
If pi is equal across locations j, the average number of applications rj
received by a vacancy does not depend on its location, as there is a bijective
relationship between pij and rj. Thus, rj will be equal to the total number of
applications divided by the number of vacancies:
∑
k pkjUk = a¯U¯/V¯ , where U¯
is the total number of unemployed workers in the economy and V¯ is the total
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number of vacancies. Thus, we can rewrite pi as:
pi = qR
(
qa¯
U¯
V¯
)
and the total number of matches is:
M∗ = U¯
[
1− exp
(
−qa¯R
(
qa¯
U¯
V¯
))]
(7)
Interestingly, the number of matches obtained with the allocation that equal-
izes pi across ZIPs is identical to the one obtained with any allocation of job
seekers in the case where there is no distaste for distance (Appendix B), which
supports our initial conjecture that reallocating job seekers to equalize pi max-
imizes matches.24
Our interconnected-markets mismatch index is then defined as one minus
the ratio between the number of matches with the actual allocation of job
seekers and the maximum number of matches:
Mi = 1−
∑
k
Uk
U¯
1− exp
(
−a¯
∑
` pi
1+α
` g(dk`)V`∑
` pi
α
` g(dk`)V`
)
1− exp (−qa¯R (qa¯U¯/V¯ )) (8)
In contrast with our approach, most of the existing literature makes the
simplifying assumption that markets are distinct, that is: (i) job seekers can
only apply to vacancies within their own unit, (ii) job seekers are equally likely
to apply to all vacancies within their own unit. If we assume g(dii) = 1 within
24One can also define the allocation of job seekers that maximizes hires. Denote V˜k =∑
` g(dk`)V`, X the matrix of term [g(dij)V˜i]ij and b a vector of ones (of dimension the
number of ZIP codes). The allocation of job seekers such that pi is constant across ZIP
codes is equal to U∗ = U¯b′X−1bX
−1b
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the unit and g(dij) = 0 if i 6= j, we can build a distinct-market mismatch
index equal to:
Md = 1−
∑
k
Uk
U¯
1− exp (−qa¯R (qa¯Uk/Vk))
1− exp (−qa¯R (qa¯U¯/V¯ )) (9)
4.4 Geographic mismatch: results
Mismatch is most accurately captured by our mismatch index Mi (equation
8) at the ZIP code level, because it allows for detailed geography and for
interconnected labor markets. Using our preferred measure of mismatch, we
find that geographic mismatch is very small: 5.3% of hires are lost due to the
misallocation of job seekers (Figure 6, interconnected markets).
Our mismatch estimate of 5.3% implies that we could reduce U.S. ag-
gregate unemployment by approximately 5.3% if we reallocated job seekers to
maximize hires.25 Aggregating the data to the MSA, CZ, county26 or ZIP code
level consistently yields a mismatch close to 5%.27 It is only if we aggregate
25At the steady state, the unemployment rate is given by u = µu/(µe + µu) with µu the
entry rate and µe the exit rate to/from unemployment. If µu is fixed and µe increases to
µ∗e when we go to the hires-maximizing allocation, M = 1 − µe/µ∗e. The decrease in the
steady-state unemployment rate is equal to (u− u∗)/u = (µ∗e − µe)/(µ∗e + µu). Given that
µe >> µu, (u− u∗)/u 'M.
26The level of mismatch at the county level is slightly higher than at the ZIP code level.
Indeed, unlike the Cobb-Douglas mismatch index, our mismatch index does not monoton-
ically decline when data is more aggregated. When we aggregate the data at the county
level, we place all job seekers and all jobs in the middle of the county. Such an aggregation
procedure puts job seekers closer to jobs in their own county but further away from jobs in
other counties, leading to a negative net effect on the number of matches.
27When the model is estimated at the ZIP or county level, we consider that the internal
distance (within the same ZIP or same county) is 0. When the model is estimated at coarser
levels (CZ, MSA, state), we follow the trade literature dealing with the estimation of gravity
models and introduce the internal distance defined as two-third of the square root of the
area of the unit divided by pi (Head and Mayer, 2004).
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the data at the state level that mismatch is markedly smaller. Thus, for a
broad range of aggregation levels, mismatch is stable around 5%.28
The fact that geographic mismatch is low may seem surprising given the
differences in unemployment rates across U.S. states. In our model, dispersion
in unemployment across states is due to dispersion in labor market tightness.
Crucially, our matching function implies a small impact of dispersion in tight-
ness on aggregate unemployment, a feature that is shared by the Cobb-Douglas
mismatch index at the state level. Therefore, high dispersion in unemployment
rates across states is compatible with low geographic mismatch because such
dispersion does not result in large losses in the aggregate number of matches.
A recent literature has attempted to isolate the determinants of workers’
location decisions (e.g. Diamond, 2015) and to explore the sources of differences
in unemployment rates across states (e.g. Herz and Van Rens, 2015; Amior and
Manning, 2015). Our results suggest that these differences in unemployment
rates across locations do not matter much for aggregate unemployment: what-
ever its sources, unemployment dispersion accounts for a very limited amount
of aggregate unemployment.
The Cobb-Douglas indexMCD (Figure 5) using county level data yields
a level of mismatch that is similar to our preferred measure based on ZIP code
data. However,MCD grossly overestimates mismatch based on ZIP code data,
and underestimates mismatch based on CZ or MSA data. These differences
arise both because our model uses a different matching function, and because
28In a robustness test, we recalculated mismatch at the MSA and CZ levels including
vacancies for which we have the city but not the ZIP code (i.e. essentially all vacancies).
The resulting mismatch do not change much: 5.28% at the MSA level and 5.47% at the CZ
level.
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we allow for applications across geographic units.
To understand the independent role of allowing for applications across
geographic areas, we recalculate mismatch with our model, but preventing job
seekers from applying across geographic areas (Md, equation 9). The distinct
markets mismatch indexMd (Figure 6) yields similar results to those arising
from the Cobb-Douglas mismatch indexMCD. Just likeMCD,Md is sensitive
to the size of the area where job seekers are assumed to look for jobs, with
larger areas yielding smaller levels of mismatch. This similarity suggests that
the discrepancy betweenMi and the Cobb-Douglas index is mostly due to the
fact that our index accounts for across markets applications rather than to the
functional form of the matching function.
Overall, using a search and matching model that fully takes into account
the geography of job search and data at the ZIP code level, we find that
eliminating geographic mismatch would reduce U.S. aggregate unemployment
by at most 5.3%.
5 Robustness and Extensions
5.1 Geographic and occupational mismatch
Mismatch unemployment can be the result of a different geographic distribu-
tion of job seekers and job vacancies, but it can also result from a different
distribution of job seekers and job vacancies across occupations. Moreover,
the occupation and spatial dimensions may interact to further increase mis-
match. In this sub-section, we move beyond purely geographical mismatch,
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and compute mismatch combining geographic and occupational heterogeneity.
We define a labor market as a location and an occupation and calculate
mismatch using these two dimensions at the same time. In order to keep
computations tractable, we define labor markets as the intersection of SOC-2
occupations and Commuting Zones, obtaining around 10,000 CZ*SOC-2 labor
markets. For job seekers, their occupation is defined as the occupation of their
last job on their resume. Just as we do not assume that job seekers only apply
in their home location, we do not assume that job seekers whose last job was
in a given occupation will restrict their applications to the same occupation.
5.1.1 Distaste for geographic and occupational distance
Restricting applications to be within CZ*SOC2 would be a bad approximation
to reality since only 26% of applications are within CZ*SOC2. Therefore, we
need to define an application function that depends both on the geographic
distance between CZs and on the occupational distance between SOC2s.
To estimate distance between two SOC, we use factor analysis, an ap-
proach common to the existing literature (Poletaev and Robinson, 2008). For
each 8-digit SOC, there is a vector (defined by ONet) of about 200 elements
that represents the knowledge, skills and abilities associated with the jobs in
this occupation. We perform a factor analysis on these vectors to extract
the major dimensions of heterogeneity across occupations. We consider the
first two factors: the first one corresponds roughly to the level of intellectual
knowledge and abilities required for an occupation (high for executives, for
instance), while the second corresponds to physical and technical skills (high
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for construction workers or electricians, for instance). Then, for each 2-digit
SOC, we take the mean of each factor across the 8-digit SOCs that together
constitute the 2-digit SOC.
We estimate a model similar to the one described in equation (1), and
we add a dummy for applying to an occupation that is different from the one
held in the last job, as well as functions of the two factors estimated above.
Specifically, the probability for a job seeker in labor market (i, o) (CZ i and
occupation o) to apply for a job in labor market (j,m) (CZ j and occupation
m) is:
µ(i,o),(j,m) = Ui,oVj,m exp[αi,o + s(dij) + α11{o 6= m} (10)
+ α2
[
(φo − φm)2 + (ψo − ψm)2
]1/2
+ α3(φo − φm) + α4(ψo − ψm)]
where dij is the geographic distance between the centroids of the CZs i and j,
αi,o is a job seeker CZ×occupation fixed effect29. α1 estimates a discontinuous
preference for one’s own SOC2, so we expect α1 < 0. α2 is the coefficient on the
distance between two SOC2 using the two factors φ and ψ: we expect α2 < 0.
α3 and α4 capture the fact that, in each skill dimension, it might be easier
to apply to jobs that are less skilled than one’s own occupation, so we expect
α3, α4 > 0. In appendix E Table 3, we show the results of these estimates,
and confirm the predictions about the sign of the coefficients. For example,
the estimates imply that job seekers are 2.8 times less likely to apply to a
SOC2 different from their own, even after accounting for levels of each SOC2
29We also estimated the model with job CZ×occupation fixed effects, and estimates are
very similar as shown in appendix E Table 3.
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in the two main factors, as well as the differences in factors between the two
SOC2. Clearly, job seekers prefer their own SOC2, but this preference is not
overwhelming and hence it is necessary to model across-SOC2 applications.
5.1.2 Geographic and occupational mismatch: results
Plugging the estimates of the distaste for geographic and occupational dis-
tance into our mismatch indexMi and using the same parameter estimation
procedure as for our main estimate (i.e. as in Table 2), we find that 6.9% of
hires are lost due to a combination of geographic and occupational mismatch
(Figure 7). Thus, the mismatch index corresponding to the CZ*SOC-2 la-
bor markets is higher than the one corresponding to interconnected CZ labor
markets (4.25%), or even distinct CZ labor markets (5.5%) (Figure 7).
How does heterogeneity by occupation contribute to mismatch compared
to heterogeneity across geography? To shed light on this question, we shut
down applications across CZ, across SOC2, or both (Figure 7). If we shut
down applications across CZ (distinct CZ) but still allow job seekers to apply
across SOC2, mismatch is 8.0%. If we instead shut down applications across
SOC2 (distinct SOC2) but allow applications across CZ, mismatch is 14.6%,
which is twice as high as the level of geographic mismatch estimated when
allowing applications across occupations. Finally, in the case where we shut
down applications both across CZs and across SOCs, thus assuming distinct
CZ*SOC2 markets, mismatch is 17.2%.30 We conclude that mismatch is more
30There is an interaction effect whereby not allowing for geographically interconnected
markets yields a larger increase in mismatch if we also do not allow for interconnected
occupations: 14.6% to 17.2% vs. 6.9% to 8% in the case of interconnected occupations.
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severely overestimated by not allowing for applications across SOC-2 than by
not allowing for applications across CZ.
5.1.3 Mismatch by detailed SOC code and by education
Since in the previous section we used a relatively coarse grouping of occupa-
tions, this could underestimate mismatch. Here we compute mismatch for the
most common 8-digit SOC among job seekers (customer service representa-
tives) and the most common 8-digit SOC among vacancies (registered nurse).
To compute mismatch for customer service representatives, we only keep job
seekers and jobs in this occupation; the same applies to mismatch for registered
nurses. We estimate mismatch with occupation-specific distaste for distance
(Figure 4), and leave all other parameters as in the baseline.
For registered nurses, 5.1% of hires are lost due to mismatch. For cus-
tomer service representatives, mismatch is much higher at 9.3%. The higher
mismatch for customer service representatives is mostly due to their worse
distribution across the territory (further away from jobs) rather than to their
greater distaste for distance. Indeed, if we assume that customer service rep-
resentatives have the same distaste for distance as registered nurses, mismatch
for customer service representatives is still 8.6%. Note that these mismatch
indices are overestimated because we computed them under the assumption
that job seekers only apply to jobs in their past 6-digit occupation. The overall
conclusion is that mismatch can vary considerably across occupations but it
stays relatively small even for occupations that are more prone to mismatch.
We also compute mismatch unemployment by level of education (high
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school, associates, BA and above), assuming that job seekers only apply to jobs
in their own occupation. We find that mismatch unemployment decreases with
the level of education consistent with more educated workers being more will-
ing to apply far away from home at long distances (Figure 3). Yet, mismatch
is never much higher than 5% (appendix C).
Overall, we find that occupational mismatch is considerably overesti-
mated if we ignore applications across occupations. Eliminating both geo-
graphical (CZ) and occupational (SOC-2) mismatch would reduce U.S. aggre-
gate unemployment by only 6.9%, and not 17.2% as would be the case if job
seekers did not apply across occupations and CZs.
5.2 Mismatch for various distastes for distance
People who use CareerBuilder for job search may have lower distaste for dis-
tance. So, would mismatch increase a lot if distaste for distance were greater?
We compute mismatch at the ZIP code level and for different distastes for
distance. We rely on our baseline estimate of the distaste for distance and
parametrize it with ξ: g = exp(ξs(d)), where s(.) is the spline estimated in
the reduced-form equation (1). We let the parameter ξ vary between 0 and 10
in increments of 0.5.
An increase in the distaste for distance starting from our baseline of
ξ = 1 barely increases geographic mismatch (Figure 8, actual allocation). If
we multiply the distaste for distance by two, mismatch increases to 6%, and
even if we multiply the distaste for distance by 5, mismatch is still only 7.8%.
Thus, even if our data underestimates the distaste for distance compared to a
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representative sample, this barely affects the level of geographic mismatch.
How high would mismatch be if American job seekers had the same
distaste for distance as the British job seekers? American job seekers are eight
times31 more willing to apply to vacancies far away from home than the British
job seekers32 studied by Manning and Petrongolo (2011). When we plug the
British distaste for distance in our model, we find that the U.S. mismatch
almost doubles, at 10.8%..
Despite the fact that British job seekers have a greater distaste for dis-
tance than American job seekers, Manning and Petrongolo (2011) found that
place-based policies are rather ineffective. Indeed, job seekers from other areas
apply to newly created jobs in target areas, so the positive employment effect
for target area residents is muted. Because job seekers in the US apply much
further away from their home area than in the UK, the impact of place-based
policies in contemporary U.S. is likely to be even more muted.
We have just seen that the level of mismatch is not very sensitive to the
distaste for distance, which suggests that job seekers are fairly close to jobs
already. On the other hand, if job seekers were allocated uniformly across
space (i.e. the number of job seekers in a ZIP code depends on the ZIP code
area), greater distaste for distance would dramatically increase geographic
mismatch. For most values of the distaste for distance, mismatch is much
31Job 0 is preferred to job 1 to job 1 iff g(d1)ε1 > g(d0)ε0. Because ε0 and ε1 are Pareto,
the probability to prefer a job at distance d rather than the one at distance 0 is after some
algebra exp(s(d1))/2. In our case, this amounts to exp(−0.0471397∗6.2)/2 = 0.37; with the
estimates found in (Manning and Petrongolo, 2011), exp(−0.3 ∗ 10) = 5%.
32This difference may reflect differences between the U.S. and UK labor markets. It
might also be influenced by the methodology used: Manning and Petrongolo (2011) infer
the distaste for distance parameter from the estimation of a search-and-matching model but
cannot directly observe job seekers’ application behavior.
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higher with the uniform than with the actual allocation (Figure 8, compare
blue and red bars).33 With a uniform allocation and the British distaste for
distance, mismatch would be as high as 63.7%! These results suggest that,
with the actual allocation of job seekers, increasing the distaste for distance
has little impact on mismatch because job seekers already live pretty close to
vacancies on average.
Based on this analysis, geographic mismatch is low because distaste for
distance is low enough, and job seekers are already fairly close to vacancies.
In a dynamic framework, low distaste for distance can explain why job seekers
are relatively well allocated across space: over time, job seekers relocate to
follow vacancies so that, at any given point in time, job seekers live close to
vacancies on average.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have used a novel dataset from CareerBuilder.com to doc-
ument how far job seekers are willing to apply to jobs and, based on this
evidence, we have measured the degree of geographic mismatch. Our measure
of geographic mismatch is based on a search and matching model of the labor
market in which job seekers strategically choose where to send their appli-
33When the distaste for distance is very low, the uniform allocation of job seekers yields
a lower level of geographic mismatch than the actual allocation of job seekers. This is
most likely due to the fact that job seekers are overly concentrated close to big job centers,
which reduces their job finding probability and makes them miss out on vacancies that are
a further afield. Thus, the job finding rate predicted by our model is lower close to business
centers (defined as the ZIP code in each state with the highest number of vacancies). For
low distaste for distance, the uniform allocation fixes this issue by placing job seekers further
away from business centers.
37
cations. Quantitatively, we find that U.S. aggregate unemployment would be
reduced by at most 5.3% if job seekers were reallocated so as to maximize hires.
Therefore, geographic mismatch is a minor driver of U.S. unemployment.
Low mismatch can be explained by job seekers’ high enough willingness
to apply far away from home combined with the fact that the typical job seeker
does not live very far away from jobs. We also extend our model to measure ge-
ographic and occupational mismatch taken together. Adding the occupational
dimension (2-digit SOC codes) naturally increases mismatch. Yet, geographic
and occupational mismatch remains low (6.9%) as long as job seekers are al-
lowed to apply across occupations.
Overall, we find that geographic mismatch is a minor cause of unemploy-
ment at the macro level. Thus, policies that attempt to combat geographic
mismatch by reducing barriers to worker mobility or moving job seekers and
jobs closer to each other are likely to have a limited effect on aggregate unem-
ployment.
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Figure 1: Average share of applications sent within
the same geographic area
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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function of geographic distance: predictions from
Poisson model with or without fixed effects
Source: CareerBuilder database.
0.00
0.25
0.50
0.75
1.00
0 50 100 150 200
Distance (mi)
R
el
at
ive
 p
ro
ba
bi
lity
 o
f a
pp
lic
at
io
n
education
HS
AA
BA
Figure 3: Relative probability of application as a
function of geographic distance: predictions from
Poisson model by education with job seeker ZIP
code fixed effects
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Table 1: Probability of application as a function of distance: Poisson regression
No fixed effect User fixed effect Job fixed effect Two-way fixed effect
(10 % sample)
γ1 -0.054*** -0.047*** -0.047*** -0.059***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
γ2 0.0005 -0.007*** -0.001 0.004***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
γ3 -0.003** -0.010*** -0.0001 -0.005***
(.00158) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
γ4 -0.021*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.033***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
γ5 0.016*** 0.032*** 0.014*** 0.030***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
γ6 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.039***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
γ7 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.014***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
γ8 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ9 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ10 -0.0002*** -0.0002** -0.0003*** -0.0004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
γ11 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of Observations 3.37×108 3.37×108 3.37×108 1.84×107
Log-Pseudolikelihood -7961547.5 -6419687.7 -6191151.4 -487220.13
Pseudo-R2 0.7218
Notes: Poisson model (column 1) or conditional Fixed-Effect Poisson model with user ZIP code fixed effects (column 2), job
ZIP code fixed effects (column 3) or twoway fixed effects (column 4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01,
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The 10 nodes for the spline that parametrizes workers’ willingness to apply as a function of distance are at 10, 20, 30, 50, 75,
100, 200, 500, 1000 and 2000 miles. The piecewise-linear spline function is defined by its slopes. With 10 nodes {d¯i}i=1...10,
the spline is parameterized by 11 parameters {γi}i=1...(11). It is defined so that the derivative of the spline with respect to
distance is s′(d) = γ1 when distance is below the first node, i.e. when d < d¯1; s′(d) =
∑j
i=1 γi when d ∈ (d¯j−1, d¯j) and
j = 2 . . . 10; s′(d) =
∑11
i=1 γi when d > d¯10.
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Table 2: Model parameters
Parameter Notation Value Setting procedure
Job seekers in each ZIP code Ui From data
Vacancies in each ZIP code Vj From data, adjusted so that
aggregate tightness
matches VJOLTS/UCPS
Average number of a¯ 12.6 From data
applications
Probability of a valid q 0.0290 Estimated to match the national
application CPS job finding rate
Scaling parameter for η 1.0020 Estimated to match the geographic
the desutility of distance distribution of applications
Pareto parameter for α 0.4629 Estimated to match the geographic
match-specific utility shock distribution of applications
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FOR ONLINE PUBLICATION: Appendix
Appendix A Job seekers’ optimal application strat-
egy
Here, we derive job seekers’ optimal strategies. Let v = {v1, . . . va¯} be the
a¯-tuple of vacancies worker u applies to. We use the convention that utilities
are ranked as: wuv1 ≥ wuv2 ≥ . . . wuva¯ . The expected utility associated with
strategy v is:
U(v) = pij(v1)wuv1 +
a¯∑
k=2
[
k−1∏
`=1
(1− pij(v`))
]
pij(vk)wuvk (11)
With probability pij(v1), the job seeker u gets an offer from the highest utility
vacancy v1, which is located in j. Whatever other offers he might get, he takes
v1 and his utility is wuv1 . He only takes an offer from vacancy vk if he does
not get any offer from higher utility vacancies vk′ , k′ < k, which happens with
probability
∏k−1
`=1 (1− pij(v`)).
Determining which strategy maximizes expected utility in equation 11 is
complex: an algorithm such as the one described in Chade and Smith (2006)
should be used. In the general case, it is not an optimal strategy to apply to
the a¯ highest expected utility jobs. Instead, workers should first apply to the
highest expected utility job, and then gamble upwards by applying to jobs that
have lower probability of yielding an offer but higher utility. Computing the
optimal strategy using the Chade and Smith (2006) algorithm would make our
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model computationally intractable. We must therefore find some reasonable
simplifying assumption to restore tractability.
One way to simplify the problem is to assume that the probability of a
worker getting more than one offer is zero. Manning and Petrongolo (2011)
assume that the probability of getting an offer from any given job is so low
that the probability to receive two offers or more is negligible. In this case, the
expected utility simplifies to U(v) = ∑k pij(vk)wuvk , implying that the optimal
strategy is to apply to the vacancies with the highest expected utility.
Another way of simplifying the problem is to assume that the probability
piv of getting an offer and the utility wuv associated with a vacancy v are not
negatively correlated. In this particular case, applying to the a¯ vacancies with
the highest expected utility is optimal, and the model becomes computation-
ally tractable. The intuition is this: if the probability of getting the job and
the reward are not negatively correlated, there is no trade-off between risk and
reward (utility), and there is therefore no opportunity for gambling upwards.
Therefore, if there is no negative correlation between the probability of getting
an offer from a job in a location j and the utility derived from a job in location
j, it is optimal to apply to the highest expected utility vacancies.
How likely is it that there is no negative correlation between the prob-
ability of getting an offer from a job in a location j and the utility derived
from a job in location j? Utility is the product of two terms: f(d) is strictly
decreasing with geographic distance and ε is an idiosyncratic shock. By as-
sumption, ε is a random draw across vacancies, and thus will not generate any
correlation between the probability of getting an offer pi and the utility w for
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a given vacancy.
Then, only a positive correlation between the probability of getting an
offer pi and the distance d may generate a negative (remember that f(d) is
strictly decreasing in d) correlation between the probability of getting an offer
and utility. Unfortunately, it is hard to directly measure the correlation be-
tween pi and the distance d because we don’t observe the probability of getting
an offer but instead infer it on the basis of applicants’ behavior. Therefore, the
inferred probabilities of getting an offer pij in different locations j depend pre-
cisely on the assumption about the strategy pursued by job seekers. To make
the case that the correlation is unlikely to be negative, we use two arguments.
First, we show that, based on the structure of the problem and the data, the
correlation between a job’s utility and the probability of getting an offer is
unlikely to be strongly negative. Second, we use the fact that, in the hires-
maximizing allocation of job seekers, the correlation between the probability
of getting an offer pi and the distance d is zero and therefore non-negative.
Using the first line of argument, we can say that, in general, if job seekers
are geographically dispersed as is the case in our data, pi and d cannot be
highly correlated either positively or negatively. To see this, suppose that
there are only two places A and B, and two job seekers X and Y who live
respectively in A and B. Jobs in place A have a higher probability pi of
generating an offer than jobs in place B. Therefore, for job seekers likeX, there
is a negative correlation between distance and the probability of getting an
offer. For job seekers like Y , there is a positive correlation between distance and
the probability of getting an offer. So, depending on the job seekers’ location,
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the correlation between distance and the probability of getting an offer from a
job could be positive or negative, implying that overall the correlation cannot
be strongly positive or negative.
The question then becomes: how frequent are job seekers like Y and how
often do opportunities for gambling upwards arise? In the simple example
above, the opportunity for gambling upwards only arises if, for job seeker Y ,
jobs in A have a higher expected utility than jobs in B. In this case, job seeker
Y would not only apply to jobs with the highest expected utility in A, but
would want to gamble upwards by applying to jobs in their own location B
that have a higher utility but a lower probability of yielding an offer. For jobs
in A to have a higher expected utility than jobs in B for Y , it must be that the
distance from B to A is not too large and/or that the probability of getting
an offer from a job in A is large enough. More generally, this suggests that
applying to the highest expected utility jobs is not optimal for job seekers in
places where the probability of getting an offer increases more steeply with
distance than the disutility of distance.
The conclusion of this first line of argument based on the structure of
the problem and the data is this: as long as there are few job seekers for whom
labor market conditions (as measured by the probability of generating an offer
pi) improve drastically within 60 miles or so of their place of residence (remem-
ber than 90% of application are sent within 60 miles), the assumption that the
probability of getting an offer pi and utility are not negatively correlated will
be generally correct.
The second line of argument relies on the hires-maximizing allocation of
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job seekers. In this allocation, pij is equal across all locations j (see equation
13): therefore, there is no correlation between the probability of getting an
offer pi and distance d, and so applying to the highest expected utility vacan-
cies is indeed optimal. Since it turns out that the actual allocation of job
seekers is fairly close to the hires-maximizing allocation of job seekers (there
is little mismatch), the pij tend to be very similar across locations, and there
is therefore not much correlation between the probability of getting an offer pi
and distance d. In conclusion, the assumption that there is no negative corre-
lation between the probability of getting an offer pi and distaste for distance
f(d) seems reasonable given the structure of the problem and the fact that the
allocation of job seekers is close to the hires-maximizing allocation.
Appendix B Number of matches when job seek-
ers have no distaste for distance
Starting from equation (3), we examine the case in which job seekers have no
distaste for distance, i.e. g(dij) = 1, ∀i, j. We derive the probability for a job
seeker in i to apply to a vacancy in j pij as:
pij = a¯
piαj∑
` pi
α
` V`
,∀i, j (12)
In this case, pij does not depend on i. Let U¯ and V¯ be the total number of
job seekers and vacancies in the economy. We now derive the probability of
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getting an offer pi. We have, for all j:
pij = qR
(
qa¯piαj
∑
k
Uk∑
` pi
α
` V`
)
= qR
(
U¯
qa¯piαj∑
` pi
α
` V`
)
The only term that depends on j on the right-hand side is pij itself. Therefore,
solving for pij is the same for any ZIP code j. Hence pi is equal across ZIP
codes in the case of no distaste for distance. Since pi is equal across ZIP codes,
we can rewrite pi as a function of parameters, i.e.:
pi = qR
(
qa¯
U¯
V¯
)
(13)
If g(dij) = 1, the total number of matches is:
M =
∑
k
Uk
[
1− exp
(
−a¯
∑
` pi
1+α
` V`∑
` pi
α
` V`
)]
(14)
Since pi is equal across ZIP codes, the total number of matches when there is
no distaste for distance is:
M = U [1− exp (−a¯pi)]
Replacing pi by its expression in equation (13),
M = U¯
[
1− exp
(
−qa¯R
(
qa¯
U¯
V¯
))]
(15)
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Thus, the number of matches obtained with no distaste for distance depends
on the aggregate number of job seekers U¯ and the inverse of aggregate labor
market tightness (U¯/V¯ ). Since there is no distaste for distance, only the
aggregates matter: the location of jobs and job seekers is irrelevant. The
total number of matches also depends on qa¯, i.e. the product between the
probability of a valid application and the average number of applications sent
by a job seeker, which is equal to the average number of valid applications
per job seeker. This makes sense since, intuitively, a larger number of valid
applications leads to more matches.
Appendix C Mismatch unemployment by edu-
cation
Our main results assume that job seekers are homogeneous: here we estimate
mismatch while allowing for worker heterogeneity by education. Specifically,
we divide job seekers in three educational groups: high school graduates, asso-
ciate degrees (AA), and bachelor degrees (BA) and more.34 We also compute
the number of vacancies for each education category based on the SOC code
of each vacancy and O*NET’s determination of the level of education needed
in each SOC code.
We compute mismatch by education assuming that job seekers only apply
to jobs in their own educational category, so that each education level is a
34In our data, we cannot separate high school dropouts from individuals with missing
information on education. While mismatch is likely to be higher for high-school dropouts
than for high-school graduates, we cannot estimate a mismatch index for this category.
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completely separate market. In a first version, we keep all parameters as in
the baseline case (i.e. Table 2), except for the geographic distribution of job
seekers and vacancies. Mismatch decreases with education (Figure 10). Yet,
even for high school graduates, mismatch is only 6.9%. In a second version, we
adjust all parameters for each education category, and we find that mismatch
for high school graduates and AA is only about 4%, while mismatch for BA
and above is only 1.8% (Figure 10).35
Overall, since mismatch remains low even for less educated workers, these
results reinforce our main conclusion that geographic mismatch is a minor
driver of U.S. aggregate unemployment.
35See Tables 4 and 5 in appendix for the parameters used and for the estimated distaste
for distance parameters by education.
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Appendix D A simpler mismatch index, and ap-
plications
In this section of the appendix, we investigate how mismatch varies with the
Pareto parameter for the match-specific utility component α, and we show
that a simpler mismatch index can be derived when α = 0. Finally, we show
how this simpler mismatch index can be used to compute mismatch under less
restrictive hypotheses while preserving computational feasibility.
D.1 Calculating a simple mismatch index
Specifically, we vary α between 0 and 2 in increments of 0.2 (remember that
our baseline estimate is α = 0.4629). Mismatch is maximum at 6% when
α = 0 and decreases for larger values of α (appendix Figure 11). This makes
sense because α can be interpreted as the weight put by applicants on the
probability of getting an offer from a given vacancy relative to the distance
to that vacancy (see equation 3). A smaller α increases mismatch because
it hinders job seekers from directing applications to vacancies with higher
probability of yielding an offer. Since we estimate a value of α that is close
to 0, our geographic mismatch is close to the maximum that it could be as a
function of α.
When α = 0, job seekers only care about distance and do not take into
account the probability of getting an offer when they apply, i.e. they are not
strategic. In this case, the mismatch index simplifies considerably because we
do not need to ensure that the probability of getting an offer pi is consistent
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with the behavior of job seekers as was the case in equation 5. The mismatch
takes a closed form that depends only on where job seekers and vacancies are
located and job seekers’ distaste for distance:
Mns = 1−
∑
k
Uk
M∗U¯
[
1− exp
(
−qa¯
∑
` g(dk`)V`R(qa¯ν`)∑
` g(dk`)V`
)]
(16)
where R(x) = [1 − exp(−x)]/x, M∗ is defined in equation (7) and νj is a
generalized inverse tightness36 in the no-strategy case defined as:
νj =
∑
k
g(dkj)Uk∑
` g(dk`)V`
(17)
Mismatch with non-strategic job seekers is very similar but slightly higher
than our baseline estimates (compare appendix Figure 12 and Figure 6 inter-
connected). This is not surprising since job seekers do not behave optimally:
they apply to vacancies only as a function of distance, and do not take into
account the probability of getting an offer. Overall, we conclude that, in the
case of the U.S. in 2012, this mismatch index with non-strategic job seekers is
a fair approximation of our more comprehensive approach.
Because it is much simpler to compute, this non-strategic mismatch index
could be straightforwardly used to calculate mismatch with other datasets that
contain the geographic distribution of job seekers and vacancies, Ui, Vj. Apart
36If we are interested in measuring the number of job seekers who compete for a job in
a ZIP code j, we don’t want to use the simple inverse tightness Uj/Vj because job seekers
apply to jobs beyond their own ZIP code. Since labor markets are interconnected, the
generalized inverse tightness at a place j will depend on the number of job seekers and job
vacancies around j. To illustrate how the generalized inverse tightness νj varies with j, we
plot it for each ZIP code j in the U.S. (appendix Figure 13).
59
from the distribution of job seekers and vacancies, only two other ingredients
are needed:
• The distaste for distance g, which we provide in Table 1. Alternatively,
users can specify any other distaste for distance.
• qa¯, the scale parameter, which should be calibrated using a target job
finding rate.
Mismatch is maximum when α = 0, but it is still only 6%. Furthermore,
the assumption that α = 0 yields a simpler mismatch index that can be used
in other applications.
D.2 Mismatch when employers have a distaste for hiring
distant workers
In our main analysis, we assume that employers do not differentiate between
workers on the basis of distance, so that the job finding rate per application q
does not depend on the distance between the job seeker and the job. Here we
relax this assumption, and we use the simple mismatch index expression to do
so.
The data does not allow us to separately identify the distaste for distance
for employers and job seekers. We therefore let the distaste for distance for
employers take different values: zero (our baseline case), half of the distaste
for distance that workers exhibit, and the same distaste for distance as work-
ers. Employers’ distaste for distance is unlikely to be as strong as workers’
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distaste for distance because workers would typically bear most of the mov-
ing and commuting costs. Since mismatch increases with employers’ distaste
for distance, assuming that employers have the same distaste for distance as
workers is likely to yield an upper bound for mismatch.
Specifically, in the simple mismatch index, we allow qa¯, the job finding
rate multiplied by the average number of applications, to differ with dij, the
distance between worker i and job j.
The job-finding rate for a worker located in i is equal to:
ri = 1− exp
(∑
` a¯q(di`)g(di`)V`R(ν˜`)∑
` g(di`)V`
)
where ν˜` =
∑
k
a¯q(dk`)g(dk`)Uk∑
j g(dkj)Vj
is a modified version of our generalized inverse
tightness, which accounts for the fact that employers value less the applications
coming from further away.
We specify a¯q(d) = a¯qg(d)ζ , with g(d) being the distaste for distance of
workers, and ζ a parameter indicating how much employers dislike applications
from far away. In what follows, we experiment with different values of ζ and
calibrate the a¯q to get the right job finding rate overall. In detail, we wish to
find the qa¯ that minimizes:
[∑
i Uiri(qa¯)∑
i Ui
− r¯
]2
Once qa¯ is known, we can compute the total number of matches:
M =
∑
i
Uiri(qa¯)
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as well as the maximum number of matches for the same job seekers:
M∗ = U¯
[
1− exp
(
−qa¯R
(
qa¯
U¯
V¯
))]
where U¯ is the total number of job seekers.
At the zip code level, the mismatch index is equal to 5.7%, 8.5% and 8.5%
respectively when employers have no distaste for distance, have half workers’
distaste for distance, and have the same distaste for distance as workers. As
is intuitive, mismatch increases when employers also exhibit a distaste for
distance, and 8.5% is likely to be an upper bound for mismatch when employers
dislike applications from far away.
D.3 Geographic mismatch with a different q in each oc-
cupation
In this subsection, we relax the assumption that the scale parameter q is
constant across occupations. We extend the geographic mismatch index from
section 4.1 by allowing q to depend on the previous occupation of job seekers,
at the 2-digit SOC level.
We use the Current Population (CPS) basic extracts to compute empir-
ical job finding rates by 2-digit SOC code as follows:
1. Create a panel data using basic CPS April through July 2012.
2. Use a crosswalk to convert the CPS occupation codes into SOC 2010
codes.
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3. Calculate the job finding rate by 2-digit SOC of origin and by month,
using weights.
4. For each 2-digit SOC, take the average across months.
The objective is to allow qa¯ in the simple mismatch index to be different
for each 2-digit SOC occupation and to reflect the job finding rates of each
occupation. The job finding rates in each occupation are used as targets to
estimate qa¯ in this task. We denote these targets as r¯o, for occupation o, and
qo the q specific to the previous occupation o of job seekers.
The job-finding rate for a worker in occupation o and located in i is equal
to:
ri(q
oa¯) = 1− exp
(
−qoa¯
∑
` g(di`)V`R(qoa¯ν`)∑
` g(di`)V`
)
where ν` =
∑
k
g(dk`)Uk∑
j g(dkj)Vj
is our generalized inverse tightness.
Calling U oi the number of workers of occupation o in location i, we wish
to find the qoa¯ that minimizes:
[∑
i U
o
i ri(q
oa¯)∑
i U
o
i
− r¯o
]2
Once qoa¯ is known, we can compute the total number of matches:
M(o) =
∑
i
U oi ri(q
oa¯)
as well as the maximum number of matches for the same job seekers:
M∗(o) = U¯ o
[
1− exp
(
−qoa¯R
(
qoa¯
U¯
V¯
))]
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where U¯ is the total number of job seekers (from all occupations).
The overall mismatch is then:
1−
∑
oM(o)∑
oM
∗(o)
At the county level, mismatch is equal to 5.5% when we allow qa¯ to vary across
occupations,37 to be compared to 6.6% when we ignore the variability of qa¯.
Therefore, allowing q to vary across occupations does not substantively impact
the measure of mismatch in the economy.
Because we are using the simpler mismatch index, we can even calculate
mismatch at the zip code by occupation level. Mismatch is equal to 5.3% when
we allow qa¯ to vary across occupations to be compared to 6.4% when we ignore
the variability of qa¯. Therefore, using this simpler mismatch index also allows
us to show that the calculation at the county level happens to given levels of
mismatch that are similar to what is measured at the zip code level.
37For a few occupations, it is not possible to find a qa¯ high enough that the job finding
rate ri(qa¯) reaches the empirical job finding rate. Since, in practice, mismatch decreases
with a higher level of qa¯, it is likely that this issue leads us to overestimate mismatch.
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Appendix E Additional figures and tables
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Figure 9: Log likelihood as a function of η, the scaling parameter for the
distaste for distance, and α the Pareto parameter for the match-specific utility
shock
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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Figure 10: Mismatch unemployment by education: baseline parameters
(“Base”) and each education category’s own specific parameters (“Spec”)
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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Figure 11: Robustness to various val-
ues of the Pareto parameter for the
match-specific utility component α
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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Figure 12: Mismatch unemploy-
ment with interconnected markets
and non-strategic job seekers
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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Figure 13: Generalized inverse tightness: number of unemployed workers per
job, taking into account the geography of job search
Source: CareerBuilder database.
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Table 3: Estimation of the CZ × SOC model
(1) (2) (3)
Geographic distance
< 50 miles -0.0405 -0.0711 -0.0671
0.0027 0.0021 0.0025
< 75 miles 0.0190 0.0586 0.0582
0.0075 0.0068 0.0080
< 100 miles -0.0573 -0.0564 -0.0603
0.0115 0.0098 0.0117
< 200 miles 0.0598 0.0459 0.0463
0.0072 0.0061 0.0073
< 500 miles 0.0155 0.0193 0.0194
0.0011 0.0014 0.0016
< 1, 000 miles 0.0031 0.0032 0.0030
0.0002 0.0003 0.0003
< 2, 000 miles 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004
0.0001 0.0002 0.0002
> 2, 000 miles 0.0004 0.0022 0.0021
0.0001 0.0003 0.0003
SOC2
Different SOC2 -1.2922 -1.0231 -0.7224
0.0696 0.0539 0.0437
Distance SOC2 -0.2271 -0.3734 -0.4532
0.0261 0.0223 0.0113
Difference Factor 1 0.2957 0.6082 0.0061
0.0112 0.0130 0.0119
Difference Factor 2 0.2598 0.3551 0.1916
0.0121 0.0116 0.0100
N 83,533,150 80,833,282 67,653,650
Fixed-effects No User CZSOC Job CZSOC
Notes: Poisson model (column 1) or Conditional Fixed-Effect Poisson model (columns 2
and 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The 10 nodes for the spline that parametrizes workers’ willingness to apply as a function
of distance are at 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 100, 200, 500, 1000 and 2000 miles. The piecewise-
linear spline function is defined by its slopes. With 10 nodes {d¯i}i=1...10, the spline is
parameterized by 11 parameters {γi}i=1...(11). It is defined so that the derivative of the
spline with respect to distance is s′(d) = γ1 when distance is below the first node, i.e. when
d < d¯1; s′(d) =
∑j
i=1 γi when d ∈ (d¯j−1, d¯j) and j = 2 . . . 10; s′(d) =
∑11
i=1 γi when d > d¯10.
Different SOC2 is a dummy for the SOC2 of the applicant’s last job differing from the
SOC2 of the vacancy. Distance SOC2 is the distance between the applicant’s SOC2 and
the vacancy’s SOC2. Difference Factor 1 is the difference between the first factor of the
applicant’s SOC2 and the first factor of the vacancy’s SOC2; the same definition holds for
Difference Factor 2. 70
Table 4: Parameters for each education category
Parameter High School Associates BA and above
Number of applications 13.8 14.0 13.6
Tightness 0.20 0.33 0.80
Job Finding Rate 0.17 0.17 0.20
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Table 5: Probability of application as a function of distance by education:
Poisson regression
(1) (2) (3)
High School AA BA and Above
γ1 -0.0348*** -0.0425*** -0.0498***
(0.00476) (0.00222) (0.00531)
γ2 -0.0146** -0.00239 0.00867
(0.00695) (0.00338) (0.00799)
γ3 -0.000455 0.00112 -0.00425
(0.00698) (0.00299) (0.00736)
γ4 -0.0461*** -0.0391*** -0.0329***
(0.00578) (0.00259) (0.00705)
γ5 0.0367*** 0.0302*** 0.0268***
(0.00635) (0.00306) (0.00756)
γ6 0.0368*** 0.0278*** 0.0353***
(0.00787) (0.00407) (0.00827)
γ7 0.00855 0.0152*** 0.00627
(0.00546) (0.00287) (0.00513)
γ8 0.00974*** 0.00500*** 0.00631***
(0.00166) (0.000822) (0.00153)
γ9 0.00401*** 0.00431*** 0.00346***
(0.000873) (0.000334) (0.000626)
γ10 -0.000335 4.36e-05 -0.000238
(0.000458) (0.000230) (0.000325)
γ11 3.07e-05 0.000253 0.000698***
(0.000367) (0.000214) (0.000237)
Observations 57,997,472 178,134,756 29,997,033
Log-PseudoLikelihood -122959.6 -1256988.9 -100679.32
Notes: Conditional Fixed-Effect Poisson model with user ZIP code fixed effects. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
The 10 nodes for the spline that parametrizes workers’ willingness to apply as a function
of distance are at 10, 20, 30, 50, 75, 100, 200, 500, 1000 and 2000 miles. The piecewise-
linear spline function is defined by its slopes. With 10 nodes {d¯i}i=1...10, the spline is
parameterized by 11 parameters {γi}i=1...(11). It is defined so that the derivative of the
spline with respect to distance is s′(d) = γ1 when distance is below the first node, i.e. when
d < d¯1; s′(d) =
∑j
i=1 γi when d ∈ (d¯j−1, d¯j) and j = 2 . . . 10; s′(d) =
∑11
i=1 γi when d > d¯10.
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